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ABSTRACT
Published macroeconomic data traditionally exclude most intangible investment from measured
GDP. This situation is beginning to change, but our estimates suggest that as much as $800 billion
is still excluded from U.S. published data (as of 2003), and that this leads to the exclusion of more
than $3 trillion of business intangible capital stock. To assess the importance of this omission, we
add capital to the standard sources-of-growth framework used by the BLS, and find that the inclusion
of our list of intangible assets makes a significant difference in the observed patterns of U.S.
economic growth. The rate of change of output per worker increases more rapidly when intangibles
are counted as capital, and capital deepening becomes the unambiguously dominant source of growth
in labor productivity. The role of multifactor productivity is correspondingly diminished, and labor's
income share is found to have decreased significantly over the last 50 years.
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                                     I.  Introduction and Background 
 
  The revolution in information technology is apparent in the profusion of new products 
available in the market place (goods with the acronyms PCs, PDAs, ATMs, wi-fi), as well as 
items like the internet, cell phones, and e-mail.  These innovations are part of a broader 
technological revolution based on the discovery of the semiconductor, often called the “IT 
revolution.”  However, while its effects are apparent in the market place, its manifestation in the 
macroeconomic statistics on growth has been slow to materialize.  Writing in 1987, Robert 
Solow, famously remarked that “you see the computer revolution everywhere except in the 
productivity data.”  Some ten years later, Alan Greenspan observed that the negative trends in 
measured productivity observed in many services industries seemed inconsistent with the fact 
that they ranked among the top computer-using industries.
1  Greenspan also questioned the 
accuracy of the consumer price index, in part because of its failure to adequately account for the 
new or superior goods made possible by the IT revolution.
2 
  The IT revolution began to appear in the productivity data mentioned by Solow in the 
mid 1990s.  This pick-up has been linked to investment in IT capital in a series of papers (Oliner 
and Sichel (2000, 2002), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Stiroh (2002), and Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh (2002)), all of which estimate the contribution of IT capital to output growth within the 
                                                 
1  Chairman Greenspan’s concerns about the measured productivity trends in services industries were first 
expressed in remarks at an FOMC meeting in late 1996 in regard to a staff analysis of disaggregated 
productivity trends (Corrado and Slifman 1999).  Gullickson and Harper (1999) also investigated this 
issue.  The observation that many of the services industries that had negative productivity trends were 
among the top computer-using industries owes, at least in part, to Stiroh (1998) and Triplett (1999). 
2  Similar views were expressed by Nordhaus (1997), who concluded from his analysis of the history of 
lighting that official price and output data “miss the most important technological revolutions in history.” 
Also, Hausman (1999) noted that cell phones were absent from the CPI market basket for many years 
after they appeared in the market place.  
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Solow-Jorgenson-Griliches sources-of-growth (SOG) framework.  However, the productivity 
pick-up did not remove all suspicion about the ability of official data to accurately capture the 
factors that affect U.S. economic growth.   Both firm-level and national income accounting 
practice has historically treated expenditure on intangible inputs as an intermediate expense and 
not as an investment that is part of GDP, although this has begun to change with the 
capitalization of software in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs).
3  The 
capitalization of software alone has had an appreciable affect on the growth of output per worker 
in the non-farm business sector, and the growing literature on intangibles suggests that this is just 
the tip of the iceberg.
4 
  Our own earlier estimates suggest that, in 1999, software spending was less than 
15 percent of a more complete list of intangible business investments that includes spending on 
innovative property (eg., R&D) and economic competencies as well as software and other 
computerized information (Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2005, hereafter CHS).   We found that 
total business investment in intangibles was approximately one trillion dollars in 1999, an 
amount that is roughly the same as investment in tangible capital at that time.  The magnitude of 
these estimates suggests that uncounted intangibles have an appreciable effect on the level of 
GDP, as well as on the rate of investment and level of labor productivity.  This paper builds on 
                                                 
3  In addition to the capitalization of software expenditures by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),  
the capitalization of scientific R&D is under serious consideration for both the U.S. NIPA and the United 
Nations System of National Accounts.  See Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen (2005) for a description of 
BEA’s procedures for estimating software. 
4  The recent literature includes work sponsored by the OECD (OECD Secretariat 1998, Kahn 2001), 
Nakamura 1999, 2001, 2003;  Brynjolffson and Yang 1999; Brynjolffson, Hitt, and Yang 2000;  Hall 
2000, 2001a, 2001b; McGratten and Prescott 2000, Lev 2001.  This literature approaches the intangibles 
problem from a variety of perspectives, building upon previous work that both linked aggregate 
productivity and stock market performance (e.g., Baily 1981, B. Hall and R. Hall 1993) and constructed 
firm-level intangible stocks using financial data (e.g., Griliches 1981, Cockburn and Griliches 1988, and 
B. Hall 1993).  
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our previous work by examining whether the relative magnitude of the discrepancy in the level 
of investment carries over to the rates of growth of capital stock and real output.  Our ultimate 
objective is to examine how the capitalization of intangible expenditures affects the SOG 
analyses that have played such a prominent role in recent analyses of the productivity pick-up.  
  We use our new SOG estimates to address the following issues:  how much growth in 
output went uncounted because of the omission of intangibles; what is the contribution of 
intangible capital to output growth; how does the inclusion of intangibles affect the allocation of 
output growth between capital formation and multifactor productivity growth; and, does the post-
1995 productivity pickup look different when intangibles are taken into account?  To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to examine these issues in the SOG framework with a more-or-
less complete list of intangible assets.  We find that the inclusion of intangibles makes a 
significant difference in the measured pattern of economic growth:  the growth rates of output 
and of output-per worker are found to increase at a noticeably more rapid rate when intangibles 
are included than under the baseline case in which intangible capital is completely ignored, and 
capital deepening (when expanded to include both tangibles and intangibles) becomes the 
unambiguously dominant source of growth in labor productivity.  More broadly, the factors 
typically associated with the growth of the “knowledge economy” assume a greater importance 
once intangibles are included. 
    We also find that the inclusion of intangibles has an important effect on the labor share of 
income.  Specifically, in our framework, labor’s share of income is lower than implied by 
conventional NIPA data, and it trends down notably over time.  The addition of intangible capital 
and the associated flow of income from that capital raise the capital share of income and lower  
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the labor share.  Moreover, our numbers indicate that intangible investment has grown 
considerably more rapidly in recent decades than has tangible business investment, and the stock 
of intangible capital has grown considerably more rapidly than has the stock of tangible business 
capital.  Thus, once intangible assets are incorporated into the calculations, the share of capital 
income shows a noticeable uptrend in recent decades, and the share of labor income shows a 
marked downtrend, particularly since 1980.   
  The paper is organized as follows: We first examine the theoretical basis for the claim 
that intangibles should be treated as capital rather than as intermediate inputs.  We then describe 
how intangible capital, which is often viewed as qualitatively different from tangible capital, can 
be incorporated in the neoclassical framework on which the sources-of-growth model is based.   
Our procedures for estimating the flow of intangible investment and the corresponding stock of 
intangible capital are then discussed, after which our growth accounting results are presented and 
discussed. 
        II.  Are Intangibles Really Capital?   
                                     A.   The Treatment of Intangible Expenditures  
  The first question to be settled is theoretical:  should intangible expenditures be classified 
as capital or as an intermediate good?  The choice between the two alternatives becomes more 
apparent when the production functions and accounting identities associated with the two 
approaches are made explicit.  This can be accomplished by considering a world of three goods, 
consumption C, tangible investment goods I, and an intangible N.  When intangibles are 
regarded as being an intermediate good, labor L and tangible capital K are allocated to the  
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production of all three goods, and N is an input to C and I.   The production function and flow 
account for each of the three sectors is then 
 
(1a)       N(t)   =   F
N(LN(t),KN(t), t);             P
N(t)N(t)   =   P
L(t)LN(t) + P
K(t)KN(t); 
(1b)       I(t)    =   F
I(LI(t),KI(t),NI(t), t);       P




(1c)       C(t)   =   F
C(LC(t),KC(t),NC(t), t);    P





with the adding up conditions  L = LN + LI + LC, K = KN + KI + KC, and N = NI + NC , as well as 
the accumulation equation  K(t)  = I(t) + (1-￿K)K(t-1).
5   The production functions in each 
equation are linked to the accounting identities by the assumption that each input is paid the 
value of its marginal product.  In this formulation, N(t) is both an output and an immediate input 
to the production of the other products, and therefore nets out in the aggregate.  Thus, N(t) does 
not appear in the GDP identity, which has the form 
 
 (1d)       P
Q’(t)Q’(t)  =  P
C(t)C(t) + P




This is the approach taken by financial accounts for individual firms, the United Nation’s System 
of National Accounts (1993), and, until the recent move to capitalize software, the U.S. NIPAs.  
In equation (1d), the apostrophes on the left-hand side of the equation are used to distinguish the 
                                                 
5  We adopt the convention that intermediates used by the industry that produced them are netted out of 
final output.  We have therefore omitted NN from the production function and accounts of the 
intermediate good industry.  We also ignore the complication of chain weighting to keep the exposition 
simple.  
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case in which intangibles are excluded from the case described below in which intangibles are 
counted as investment.  
  A different model of production accounting applies when the intangible is classified as 
capital.  The output of the intangible, N(t), now appears in the production functions of the 
consumption and tangible investment sectors as a cumulative stock, not as a contemporaneous 
input as above.  An accumulation equation for intangible capital,  R(t) = N(t) + (1-￿R)R(t-1),  
parallels the corresponding equation for tangibles.   The sectoral equations become 
 
(2a)       N(t)   =   F
N(LN(t),KN(t),RN(t),t);     P




(2b)       I(t)    =   F
I(LI(t),KI(t),RI(t),t);          P




(2c)       C(t)   =   F
C(LC(t),KC(t),RC(t),t);      P





The balance equations set out above are modified to replace the equation N =  NN + NI + NC with 
R = RI + RC +RN.
6   Again, the production functions in each equation are linked to the accounting 
identities by the assumption of marginal productivity pricing.  The GDP identity, in this case, 
                                                 
6  In this second formulation we expand the technology of the intangible producing sector to use the 
output that it produced in previous years (that is, to use its own stock of accumulated intangibles).  In 
other words, the knowledge investments of past years are allowed to be productive in producing current 
and future knowledge.  This allows investment to be aimed not just at direct product or process 
innovation, but also at furthering the capability of the innovation process itself.  Indeed, this is a key 
aspect of the R&D process, because research often is done to further the research capability of R&D 
researchers.  Moreover, some firms continue to do research even when a competitor has beat them to the 
punch, in order to keep up with best practice and perhaps get out in front in the next round.  This line of 
reasoning does not fit well with the preceding formulation (1a)-(1d) in which the accumulated stock of 
past knowledge is treated as an intermediate input and omitted from the technology for producing 
knowledge.    
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must be expanded to included the flow of new intangibles on the product side and the flow of 
services from the intangible stock on the income side:  
 
(2d)        P
Q(t)Q(t)  =  P
C(t)C(t) + P
I(t)I(t) + P






R(t) is the user cost associated with the services of the intangible stock and is a source 
of income that is absent from the conventional intermediate goods case (1d).  The concept of 
GDP in this expanded identity is more comprehensive and larger in magnitude than in the 
conventional case. 
                                  B.  Growth Accounting with Intangible Capital 
  The conventional SOG framework allocates the growth rate of output to the share-
weighted growth rates of the inputs plus a residual.  Following Solow (1957), the SOG equation 
is derived from the conventional framework of equations (1a)-(1d) by logarithmic differentiation 
of (1d): 
                     (1e)          gQ’(t)   =   s’C(t)gC(t)  +  s’I(t)gI(t)   
                                               =    s’L(t)gL(t)  +  s’K(t)gK(t)  +  gA’(t). 
 
The notation gX(t) is used to denote the rate of growth of the respective variables; for example,  
gQ’(t) thus denotes the growth rate of aggregate output (the Divisia index of the growth rates of 
consumption, gC(t),  and investment, gI(t)), and gA’(t) denotes the growth rate of multifactor 
productivity.  The output shares s’C(t) = [P
C(t)C(t)]/[P
C(t)C(t) + P
I(t)I(t)], etc., and input shares 
s’L(t)  = [P
L(t)L(t)]/[P
L(t)L(t) + P
K(t)K(t)], etc., are assumed to be equal to the corresponding  
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output elasticities.  Intangible input and output play no role in the formulation of this SOG 
equation.   
  When intangible capital is treated symmetrically with tangibles, the structure (2a)-(2d) 
governs the equations of growth, and the SOG model becomes 
 
                      (2e)           gQ(t)   =   sC(t)gC(t)  +  sI(t)gI(t)  +  sN(t)gN(t) 
                                                =    sL(t)gL(t)  +  sK(t)gK(t)  + sR(t)gR(t)  +  gA(t), 
  




N(t)N(t)], etc., and the 




R(t)R(t)], etc.  
  A comparison of (1e) and (2e) reveals that the alternative view of intangibles involves 
more than the growth terms gN(t) and gR(t), and the associated shares, but also requires a 
restatement of all shares.  The shares are linked by the factor of proportionality 
 







The basic result is that labor’s share when intangibles are capitalized is smaller by this factor:  sL  
=  ￿s’L, and the income share of capital is thus larger.  A similar analysis applies to the rates of 
saving and consumption.  Consumption shares with and without intangibles are related by the 
same proportionality factor as above, sC  =  ￿s’C.  The consumption share is smaller and the rate 
of saving/investment is correspondingly higher.  This result is relevant in view of the perception 
of a low rate of saving in the U.S. economy, particularly because existing measures exclude  
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much of the investment in knowledge capital that is a defining feature of the modern U.S. 
economy.  Finally, the residual estimates of multifactor productivity from (1e) and (2e), gA’(t) 
and gA(t), respectively, differ by the factor ￿ when the economic system is in Golden Rule steady 
state growth, a result derived from Jorgenson (1966), but the bias due to ignoring intangible 
capital, gA(t) - gA’(t), has a more complicated form in other cases.  
                                   C.   The Criteria for Capitalizing Intangibles   
  The two approaches set out above give different structural representations of the same 
economy, and both cannot be simultaneously correct.  Fortunately, standard capital theory 
provides criteria for choosing one over the other.  As discussed in CHS, capital theory implicitly 
defines capital in the context of an optimal consumption plan based on the maximization of an 
intertemporal utility function subject to the usual constraints (Weitzmann 1976).  The solution to 
this optimization problem determines the optimal path of consumption over time and thus 
consumer saving behavior, which in turn determines the paths of investment and capital.  As 
discussed in Hulten (1979), the solution to this optimization problem has an important 
implication for the treatment of intangible capital:  any use of resources that reduces current 
consumption in order to increase it in the future qualifies as an investment.  This result argues for 
symmetric treatment of all types of capital, so that, for example, spending on R&D and employee 
training should be placed on the same footing as spending on plant and equipment.  Moreover, 
this symmetry principle requires that most business expenditures aimed at enhancing the value of 
a firm and improving its products, including human capital development as well as R&D, be 
accorded the same treatment as tangible capital in national accounting systems. 
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D.  Symmetry in Production 
  The symmetry principle of the preceding section establishes the theoretical equivalence 
of tangible and intangible capital from the standpoint of consumption.  This symmetry between 
tangible and intangible capital is less apparent from the production side of the economy, which is 
perhaps one reason that intangibles have traditionally not been counted as capital.  Indeed, some 
have argued  –  particularly in the accounting world  –  that several characteristics of intangibles 
disqualify them from being counted as capital;  namely, the lack of verifiability for intangible 
assets that are not acquired through market transactions;  the lack of visibility of intangible assets 
after their acquisition that complicates efforts to track past vintages;  the non-rivalness of some 
intangible assets;  and the lack of appropriability of the returns from some intangibles.  We 
discuss each of these issues in turn and argue that such differences between tangibles and 
intangibles, while generally noteworthy, are no more relevant for the capitalization issue than are 
differences in the characteristics of equipment, structures, and land. 
  One source of production asymmetry between tangibles and intangibles arises from the 
fact that most tangible assets are purchased from other producers.  Intangible assets, on the other 
hand, often are produced within the firm that uses them, and there is thus no arms-length market 
transaction to generate observable and verifiable data with which to estimate the quantity 
produced, designated as the flow P
N(t)N(t) in the notation of this paper.  A related problem arises 
because it is also difficult to separate P
N(t)N(t) into separate price and quantity components; 
indeed, sometimes it is even difficult to define the units in which P
N(t) and N(t) ought to be 
measured (for example, in what units should knowledge be denominated?).    
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  The absence of externally verifiable data is a major reason that accountants are reluctant 
to capitalize intangibles, preferring instead to treat them as an intermediate expense that arises 
and disappears internally within the same year.  However, the lack of verifiability per se does not 
automatically make intangibles an intermediate input.  Some tangible assets are also produced 
internally (some construction projects, for example) and therefore do not pass through external 
markets that generate verifiable transactions data.  On the other hand, many intangible assets are 
acquired through external markets (technology licenses, patents and copyrights, and the 
economic competencies acquired through purchases of management and consulting services).  In 
any case, the real issue of whether intangibles should be classified as intermediates or as capital 
depends on the economic character of the good, as per the preceding section, and not on the ease 
with which P
N(t)N(t) can be measured. 
  Intangibility itself is another source of asymmetry in production.  Tangible goods have a 
physical embodiment that is capable of being observed, and it is therefore possible to observe the 
ones that have been held over from previous years in the larger stock (they often have serial 
numbers that identify their vintage).  The self-evident durability of a tangible good would 
immediately qualify it as capital rather than an intermediate good under most reasonable criteria.  
Intangibles, on the other hand, have no palpable embodiment and, in some sense, lack visibility.  
Thus, it is not feasible to look for a collection of vintages of intangible investments or even a 
single older vintage as proof that the item in question really is capital.  In the case of knowledge 
capital, for example, it is hard to know which “bit” of knowledge belongs to which vintage of 
investment.  From the perspective of national income accounting methodology, this issue could 
be characterized as the difficulty of measuring depreciation rates and obtaining stocks, R(t), for  
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intangible assets.  However, this concern is not a valid conceptual reason for treating intangibles 
as an intermediate input rather than as a capital asset.  Again, it is how the item is used over time 
that determines whether or not it should be capitalized, not the ease with which R(t) can be 
measured.   
  Yet another asymmetry between tangibles and intangibles arises because of the public 
good aspects of the latter.  Many types of intangible capital, such as R&D knowledge, are non-
rival.  The non-rivalness of pure knowledge implies that it can be employed by many users 
simultaneously without diminishing the quantity available to any single user.  In this situation, 
the balance equations would be N = NN = NI = NC and R = RI = RC =RN.  Moreover, each 
additional unit of output produced would not need an additional “unit” of knowledge, suggesting 
that the marginal product of R is zero.  However, while the marginal product of R used in the 
direct production of output may indeed be zero, this is the wrong margin to examine, because an 
increase in R increases the efficiency of production and thus increases output indirectly, or it 
improves the quality of the product (which is conventionally expressed as an equivalent increase 
in quantity).  Why else would a firm pay to increase its R if it did not yield some benefit?  In 
addition, many types of intangible capital  –  such as brand equity and organizational and human 
competencies  –  are not purely non-rival, but instead have a highly firm-specific character.  
Indeed, many intangibles are specific to a firm and valuable, at least in part, because the firm is 
able to exclude competitors from gaining access to key information and technology (the secrecy 
of the formula for Coca Cola is an example). 
   The non-appropriability of some intellectual property is another aspect of intangibles.  
The full benefits of R&D and worker training may not be captured by the firm making the  
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investment, and the measured prices P
N(t) and P
R(t) may reflect only private benefits and costs.
7   
However, as before, the capitalization issue pivots on whether the provision of R increases future 
output and consumption, not whether R is partly non-appropriable or non-rival, and these two 
features do not invalidate the need to capitalize many intangible expenditures. 
  In sum, the various characteristics that cause tangible and intangible capital to be 
different  – verifiablity, visibility, non-rivalness, and appropriability – are all important features 
that distinguish one type of capital from the other.  However, none of these differences is 
relevant to the issue of whether to treat intangible expenditures as capital.  That is determined by 
whether or not the expenditure is intended to yield output in some future time period.  This is the 
conceptual analogue on the production side to the symmetry criterion of whether the expenditure 
was made in order to increase future consumption.  Many intangibles satisfy these criteria and 
must therefore be treated as capital. 
    Symmetry in production does impose one important restriction on intangible assets.  To 
proceed as we have in the formulation of the equations (2a)-(2d), we assume that the same 
neoclassical investment rules that apply to tangible capital also apply to intangibles: investment 
in tangibles is assumed to proceed up to the point that the present value of the stream of future 
user costs, P
K(t +￿) just equals the cost of acquiring a marginal unit of the investment good, P
I(t).  
Applied to intangibles, this assumption implies that investment is made using marginalist 
principles.  An alternative Schumpetarian view of the firm might reject this assumption, but we 
                                                 
7  Any externalities due to unappropriated benefits from R&D or other investments appear as a shift in the 
production function and are picked up in measured MFP (Hulten 2001).  This is essentially the 
mechanism of endogenous growth theory when externalities arise from R&D (Romer 1986) and 
education (Lucas 1988).   
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adopt the marginalist approach because our objective is to integrate intangible capital into the 
neoclassical sources-of growth framework of equation (2e), which is based on marginalist 
principles.               
                                                    E.  Prices and Deflators  
     The SOG equations of the preceding section are computationally derived from the 
accounting structure in equations (2a)-(2d) using price deflators to convert nominal values into 
their real counterparts.  As discussed above, a difficult aspect of this computation is measuring 
the price deflator P
N(t) needed to convert estimates of expenditure P
N(t)N(t) into real estimates.  
This has proved to be one of the most difficult empirical issues in the study of R&D investment, 
in large part because of the verifiability and visibility issues described above.  The strategy in the 
R&D literature has been to use input costs to proxy for P
N(t); the most common approach has 
been to average a wage deflator and a price deflator for a broad measure of output on the grounds 
that R&D expenditures are roughly 50 percent labor costs and 50 percent supplies.
8 
  In contrast to this approach, we opt for a pure output deflator as a proxy for the price of 
intangibles.  Although we consider this proxy only a placeholder until further research develops 
deflators for specific intangibles, we believe that a price measure is preferred to a wage measure 
for the following reason.  Under constant returns to scale in the technology in (2a), the growth 
rate of the price of the intangible capital good is:   
         
                     (4)          gPN(t)   =   sLN(t)gPL(t)  +  sKN(t)gPK(t) + sRN(t)gPR(t) -  gAN(t),                   
                                                 
8   This approach to constructing a deflator for R&D was developed and used by Jaffe (1972) and then by 
Griliches (1984).  
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R(t)RN(t) ] is labor’s income share in the 
production of intangible investment.  Using the wage  P
L(t) as a proxy for P
N(t) is equivalent to 
assuming that the growth rate of output price is gPN(t) is equal to the growth rate of wages, gPL(t).  
As can be seen in equation (4), this will occur only if labor is the sole input to the production of 
the intangible and if the rate of multifactor productivity growth in the production of intangibles, 
gAN(t), and the shares of tangible and intangible capital, sKN(t) and sRN(t), are all zero.  These 
assumptions are extremely implausible, because, for example, R&D programs require plant and 
equipment, and knowledge builds on knowledge.  Because using a wage deflator tends to give  
biased results, we adopt the nonfarm business output price deflator as a proxy for P
N(t).  This 
proxy can be rationalized by the fact that much R&D and coinvestments in marketing and human 
competencies are tied to specific product lines.  Integrating the cost of productivity-enhancing 
investments back into the “using” industries is accomplished generally by adopting the nonfarm 
business output price as the deflator for intangibles.
9 
  The search for an appropriate deflator for the user cost of intangibles, P
R(t), also poses 
challenges.  The corresponding user cost of tangible capital, P
K(t ), is not usually observed but 
can be imputed following Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967).  When intangibles 
are ignored, the conventionally measured rental flow, P
K(t)K(t), is estimated by the residual 
income not attributable to labor, P
C(t)C(t) + P
I(t)I(t) - P
L(t)L(t).  This leads to an error because, 
when income accrues to intangible capital, the conventionally measured residual term for capital 
income actually equals  
                                                 
9 Martin Baily offered this rationale for the deflation of the output of management consultancies (see 
Triplett and Bosworth 2004, p 260).  
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(5)         P
C(t)C(t) + P
I(t)I(t) - P





The conventional practice of ignoring intangible capital thus leads, in general, to a biased 
estimate of the income accruing to tangible capital.  There is, moreover, another subtle issue that 
arises because the total capital income on the right-hand side of (5) is measured by the sum of all 
property-type income (interest, dividends, retained earnings, taxes, and depreciation).  This list 
accounts for all the non-labor payments accruing to both tangible and intangible capital, i.e., to 
P
K(t)K(t) + P
R(t) R(t), leaving no apparent role for the intangible investment, P
N(t)N(t).  As the 
right-hand side of equation (5) illustrates, the answer to this apparent contradiction is that the 
income accruing to intangible investments is reflected on the input side as uncounted profits.  
Specifically, when intangibles are treated as an intermediate input, the spending on intangibles is 
subtracted from revenue as an expense, reducing measured profits.  On the other hand, when 
intangibles are treated as an investment, they are not subtracted from revenue in the period of 
purchase, and profits are higher.  Thus, the symmetric treatment of tangible and intangible 
capital is not just about P
N(t)N(t) as uncounted output, but also about P
N(t)N(t) as uncounted 
income accruing to capital. 
 
III. Estimates of Intangible Investment and Capital 
A. Measuring Investment in Intangibles 
  In our earlier work, we developed estimates of a broad range of business investments in 
intangibles in the 1990s.  Our results are summarized in Table 1 for the three broad categories of 
intangibles included in our analysis, with separate detail for two of the categories.  We first  
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estimated expenditures on each type of intangible (the first column in the table), and then, based 
on available economic research and evidence, we determined how much of each expenditure 
might be considered business investment according to the criterion of whether the expenditure 
could be deemed to yield future consumption (the last column).  Estimates are the annual average 
for the period shown (the late 1990s), and the numbers in parentheses indicate how much of each 
type of investment currently is included in the NIPAs.      
  The rationale for our choice of categories is discussed in some detail in our the previous 
paper.  We only note here that our choice was driven, in large part, by our desire to go beyond 
existing categories to develop a more comprehensive list.  Our first broad category, business 
investment in computerized information, is largely composed of the NIPA series for business 
investment in computer software.
10  Our second category, innovative property, includes the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) Industrial R&D series.  However, the NSF’s survey is 
designed to capture only innovative activity built on a scientific base of knowledge and therefore 
does not fully capture resources devoted by businesses to innovation and new product/process 
R&D more broadly.
11   This “other” R&D – we called it nonscientific R&D – includes the 
revenues of the nonscientific commercial R&D industry, as measured in the Census Bureau’s 
                                                 
10  The NIPA software series is conceptually consistent with our intertemporal criterion for defining capital 
because the software measure includes both purchased and own-account components.  National 
accountants estimated the own-account component indirectly to overcome the verifiability issue discussed 
earlier (Parker and Grimm 1999). 
11 The survey asks companies to include “activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by 
experience, in: biological sciences, computer science, engineering, mathematical and statistical sciences, 
and physical sciences (e.g., chemistry and physics)” but to exclude “quality control, routine product 
testing, market research, sales promotion, ... and other nontechnological activities; ... and research in the 
social sciences or psychology.”  In a further clarification, the survey instructs companies to include 
expenditures for conducting clinical trials for drugs and software development if the application has 
commercial value, but to exclude “software development intended for within company use only.”  
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Services Annual Survey (SAS), as well as the costs of developing new motion picture films and 
other forms of entertainment, and a crude estimate of the spending for new product development 
by financial services and insurance firms.
12  It is apparent from Table 1 that, by the late 1990s, 
investment in non-scientific R&D was as large as investment in scientific R&D. 
  Our third general category includes investment in what we have called “economic 
competencies.”  This includes spending on strategic planning, spending on redesigning or 
reconfiguring existing products in existing markets, investments to retain or gain market share, 
and investments in brand names.  Expenditures for advertising are a large part of the investments 
in brand equity, but as stressed in our earlier work, not all spending on intangibles should be 
counted as capital spending.  Based on results from the empirical literature on advertising, we 
estimated that only about 60 percent of total advertising expenditures were for ads that had long-
lasting effects (that is, effects that last more than one year). 
  Investment in firm-specific human and structural resources is the second type of economic 
competency included in our estimates.  It includes the costs of employer-provided worker training 
and an estimate of management time devoted to enhancing the productivity of the firm.  Our 
estimates of the former are based on BLS surveys; the latter are based on SAS revenues for the 
management consultant industry and trends in the cost and number of persons employed in 
executive occupations.  Without doubt, these spending flows are imprecisely estimated, but 
business investments in firm-specific human and structural resources through strategic planning, 
adaptation, reorganization, and employee-skill building are important drivers of innovation and 
                                                 
12  Many new products in the financial services industry involve computerized information; to avoid 
double-counting (particularly with the own-account portion of computer software), we deliberately were 
very conservative in our estimates for this component.  
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profitability in industry and require treatment as investment to be consistent with capital theory.
13 
Moreover, this last category is, by our reckoning, the largest type of business intangible 
investment.  And, total investment in economic competencies is nearly as large as the investment 
in the other two major categories combined. 
  Two other facts emerged from our earlier work.  First, total investment in intangibles grew 
more rapidly than investment in tangibles over the decade of the 1990s, although the levels of the 
two were nearly equal in magnitude for the decade as a whole.  Second, investment in the 
categories of intangibles already included in the NIPAs was only a fraction of our estimated total, 
even if all scientific R&D were included.  Together, these findings suggest that a longer time 
series on the growth of intangible business investment would indicate a strong dynamic role for 
intangibles in explaining economic growth and might significantly affect our understanding of the 
sources of growth of the U.S. nonfarm business sector. 
  Table 2 reports our new estimates of business investment in the intangibles shown in 
table 1 by decade starting in 1950.  In general, the estimates shown in table 2 were derived using 
the same methods and sources as used in our earlier paper.  Most of the needed source data begin 
at least by the late 1940s, and the series for spending on scientific R&D and on brand equity begin 
much earlier.  However, for a few components we could not use the same sources for earlier 
periods, and the components were extrapolated backward in time using related series.  This 
occurred most prominently for the series based on SAS data, which are not available prior to the 
                                                 
13 Moreover, the micro data evidence of Abowd et. al (2005) suggests that firm-level differences in 
organizational practices (proxied by firm-level distributions of human capital) are strongly related to 
outcomes such as revenue per worker and market valuation.  
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mid-1980s.  All SAS series were extrapolated back using a related aggregate in the BEA’s gross 
product by industry system that is available beginning in the late-1940s.
14   
  For employer-provided training we made some changes to the estimates for recent years 
and made some special adjustments to estimates for earlier years.  In our earlier work, we used 
trends in wage costs and the industrial structure of the workforce to extrapolate the results of 
surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the mid-1990s.  For this paper, we 
improved our extrapolations for more recent years by linking them to estimates from surveys that 
have been conducted by the American Society for Training and Development (ASTD) since 
1997.
15  These new results suggest a slight pullback in firms’ per-employee expenditure on 
training in 2002, perhaps reflecting the cyclical episode in 2001.  We know of no similar, survey-
based data for business outlays on employer-provided training in earlier periods. 
  The studies that established the link between training and productivity at the firm level 
(Bartel 1991, 1994) used data for earlier years (the mid-1980s), but the training measures were 
qualitative indicators, not actual figures on the amount firms invested in their employees (see also 
Black and Lynch 1996, whose data were for the early 1990s).  The BLS surveys and the more 
recent ASTD data suggest that per-employee rates of spending on (formal) training increases with 
the size of the firm.
16  The BLS surveys also show that employees in professional and managerial 
                                                 
14 Specifically, the rate of change in value added in miscellaneous professional services was used to extend 
the series for R&D in the social sciences and humanities, market research services, and management 
consulting services from 1985 back to 1947. 
15 See www.astd.org or Bassi, et. al. 2001 for further information. 
16 See table 1 in the employer survey at www.bls.gov/ept.  Only 69 percent of small establishments (fewer 
than 50 employees) provided formal training in 1995 compared with nearly all medium-sized (50-249 
employees) and large (250 or more employees) establishments.  
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occupations receive the most training (in terms of hours).
17  With the growth of the modern 
corporation and a rough doubling of the ratio of employees in professional and managerial 
occupations in the total workforce since the late 1960s, the incidence of employer-provided 
training likely has also increased by a notable, albeit unknown, amount.
18  Because an extension 
of the methods used in our earlier work would not build in an increase in incidence (except 
indirectly through its impact on the distribution of wage costs by industry), we boosted the trend 
in training implied by an extension of our earlier work by a small amount (less than 2 percent per 
year) between 1948 and 1988. 
  All told, business investment in intangibles is a vital aspect of business activity, and the 
investments shown in table 2 represent a large and growing portion of the overall economy.  The 
extent to which existing nominal output measures are understated owing to the treatment of most 
intangibles as intermediates in the national accounts is illustrated by Figures 1 and 2.  The former 
shows our measure of total investment as a share of (adjusted) nonfarm business output and 
indicates that intangibles have accounted for virtually all of the increase over the last five 
decades. (Note that software is included in “existing” investment, owing to its current treatment 
the NIPAs).  Figure 2 breaks the growth in intangible investment into its major components and 
reveals that, in recent years, the most dynamic categories of intangibles are firm-specific 
resources, non-scientific R&D, and computer software.  The major period of relative growth in 
                                                 
17  Employees in professional and paraprofessional occupations received essentially twice the number of 
hours of formal and informal training as those in other occupational groups, with training most prevalent 
for computer, professional and technical, and management skills.  See tables 1 and 6 in the employee 
survey at www.bls.gov/ept.   
18 The reported increase in the ratio of professional and managerial occupations in the workforce is based 
on data from BLS’s Current Population Survey (CPS).  Nakamura (2001) presents and discusses the 
increase in this ratio from 1982 to 2000.  We developed similar estimates using more limited CPS 
occupational categories that extend back to 1967.  
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scientific R&D was the 1950s.
19  Figure 2 also reveals the relative importance of investment in 
economic competencies as a share of the total investment.     
  The last four rows of table 2 present data on related series as a basis for further 
comparisons.  The most interesting is perhaps the last row, which presents our estimates of the 
parameter ￿ from our equation (3).  This parameter is the ratio of output with and without 
unrecognized intangibles.  When nonfarm business output is adjusted to include our estimates of 
the unrecognized intangibles, the adjusted output is 12 percent (1/￿) percent higher than the 
existing measure in the 2000-2003 period.  Fifty years ago, the adjusted measure was only about 5 
percent higher. 
                                 B.  Real Intangible Investment and Capital Stocks 
  The ultimate objective is to estimate the SOG equation (2e).  In order to do this, estimates 
of the real investment in intangibles are necessary, as are the corresponding stocks of capital.  
Real investment for each new category of intangibles was obtained by deflating the nominal 
investment estimates of the preceding section by the nonfarm business output deflator.
20  As noted 
in Section II, we believe this deflator is a plausible placeholder until further research permits 
better measures.  The NIPA price for software is retained and used for that category of 
intangibles.  
                                                 
19 Scientific R&D also bulged in the 1979-1982 period, but this bulge is accounted for by a jump in 
mineral exploration, which we include in scientific R&D along with the NSF’s Industrial R&D series.  
Expenditures on oil and gas well drilling and mining, the dominant component of mineral exploration, are 
already capitalized in the NIPAs. 
20 The nonfarm business output deflator begins in 1948.  To deflate nominal investment data that begin 
earlier (scientific R&D and brand equity, for example), the nonfarm business output deflator is linked to 
the GDP deflator.  
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  To obtain intangible capital stocks, we start with our estimates of real investment series 
N(t) and apply the capital accumulation identity of Section II,  R(t) = N(t) + (1-￿R)R(t-1).
21  Two 
further elements beyond N(t) are needed to implement the identity:  a depreciation rate, ￿, and a 
capital benchmark, R(0), for each intangible asset. 
   Relatively little is known about depreciation rates for intangibles.   Based on the limited 
information available, we made the following assumptions about depreciation rates: 
 
 
    Category        Depreciation Rate (percent) 
                        Computerized information                                      33 
    other than software) 
  R&D, scientific  20 
  R&D, nonscientific  20 
  Brand equity                  60 
  Firm-specific resources              40 
 
   For computerized information, our estimate is based on the BEA’s assumptions for own-
account software (depreciation rate of 33 percent, five-year service life).  Our estimate of the 
depreciation rate of R&D capital (20 percent) is in the middle of the range of the rates reported in 
the existing literature on R&D.  For R&D, Bernstein and Mamuneas (2004) find that the 
depreciation rate in the United States is 18 percent.  Nadiri and Prucha (1996) obtain a figure of 
12 percent.  Pakes and Schankerman (1978), using data for several European countries, obtain an 
                                                 
21Note that we are assuming that R&D investment becomes productive as soon as it is put in place; that is, 
we are assuming a gestation lag of zero.  In contrast, Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) assumed a one-year 
gestation lag.  We maintained a gestation lag of zero to avoid the complication of different gestation lags 
for different assets as is done in much of the growth accounting literature.  Hopefully, future research will 
shed further light on this issue.  
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average rate of 25 percent; in a later paper (1986), they estimate a range from 11 to 26 percent.
22  
For advertising, the empirical literature finds the effects of ads to be relatively short-lived (as 
noted earlier) but reports a wide range of findings on the longevity of advertising capital; our own 
interpretation of this literature is that advertising capital depreciates by 60 percent per year.
23 
  For firm-specific resources, we averaged the rates for brand equity and R&D.  As just 
described, the firm-specific resources category has two components.  On the one hand, the 
discernible and direct link between employer-provided training and firm-level productivity 
suggests that investments in this component are long-lasting.  On the other hand, investments 
through strategic planning and reorganization reflect business’ need to constantly adapt to 
changing economic conditions.  While such investments undoubtedly have a long-lasting 
“learning-by-doing” dimension (similar to that in R&D), we believe they also have a short-lived 
“organizational forgetting” dimension (similar to that in advertising). 
   For each asset, the initial capital stock was set to zero in the year shown below. 
  Category  Year Initial Stock Set to Zero 
  Computerized information  1958 
  R&D, scientific  1928 
        R&D, nonscientific  1945 
  Brand equity  1928 
  Firm-specific resources    1946 
                                                 
22  The 33 percent figure is the double-declining balance rate for BEA’s assumed service life of five years 
for own-account software, calculated as 1.65/5.  This ratio was originally developed by Hulten and Wykoff 
(1981). 
23  We concluded that advertising had a service life of less than 3 years based on work by Landes and 
Rosenfield (1994) who estimated implied annual geometric rates of decay of advertising for 20 two-digit 
SIC industries covering manufacturing and many services.  The Landes-Rosenfield findings also generated 
our conclusions on the amount of advertising that should be expensed (about 40 percent; see footnote 21 in 
CHS).   
  The literature is not settled on these issues.  Some find that all (Comanor and Wilson 1974) or a 
higher fraction (Hall 1981) of advertising expenditures should be expensed, while others suggest that little 
or no expensing is appropriate (Lev 2001).  Yet another econometric study found the durability of 
advertising capital to be as high as 7 years (Ayanian 1983).    
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The assumption that initial capital stocks are zero (rather than an unknown positive value) has 
little effect on our growth accounting analysis because all of the depreciation rates are relatively 
high and the true value of the benchmark will have depreciated away by the date that we start our 
growth accounting analysis (1973). 
  Table 3 shows our estimate of the nominal intangible capital stock in 2003 (in billions of 
dollars) and the annual average growth rate of real intangible capital in the 1973-1995 and 1995-
2003 periods.
24  In terms of the components of intangible capital, over the period from 1973-95, 
nonscientific R&D capital is the fastest growing new category of intangibles; over the period 
from 1995-2003, computerized information is the fastest growing category.  In both periods, 
scientific R&D is the slowest growing category.   
C.  The User Cost of Intangible Capital  
  The SOG model (2e) requires both the growth rate of intangible capital and its income 
share.  In order to estimate the income share, it is first necessary to estimate the user cost P
R(t) 
associated with each type of intangible capital.  The standard expression for the user cost of any 
asset was derived by Jorgenson (1963) and extended by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) to include 
taxes.  The Jorgensonian user cost for intangibles is given by the expression 
  (6)      P
R
i(t) = [r(t) + ￿i  - ￿i(t)] P
N
i(t),    
where r(t) a measure of the net rate of return common to all capital in year t, ￿i is the depreciation 
rate for asset i, ￿i(t) is the expected capital gain (loss) on asset i, and P
N
i(t) is the intangible 
                                                 
24  As indicated in Table 2, two components of innovative property (mineral exploration and a portion of 
architectural design services) are already included in the NIPAs and are not included as intangibles in 
Table 3; thus, we are implicitly counting them as tangible assets in the growth accounting results that 
follow.  We left them as categorized by the BEA to simplify the presentation; in any case, these categories 
are small enough that reclassifying them would make little difference in the sources of growth analysis.    
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investment price deflator.  Except for the real net rate of return r(t), each term on the right-hand 
side of this expression can be calculated for each new intangible asset from the data described 
above, with the capital gain term proxied by the three-year moving average of the nonfarm 
business price deflator.  We include the usual Hall-Jorgenson tax terms in our actual calculations 
although they are not shown in (6) for simplicity of exposition.  We estimate the net rate of return 
r(t) using the procedure developed in Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) that solves for the common 
value of r(t) in each year that causes the accounting identity in equation (5) to hold for all types of 
capital, intangible and tangible.
25 
D.  Output Measures and Income Shares 
 The next link in completing the data needed for the SOG equation (2e) is the estimation of output 
and the associated income shares.  Following equation (2d), nominal output in the nonfarm 
business sector is the sum of our estimates of current dollar intangible investment, P
N(t)N(t), and 
deliveries of consumption and tangible investment to final demand, P
C(t)C(t) + P
I(t)I(t).  The 




R(t)R(t) by the value of output.  These shares are shown in the last 
column of table 3 for the periods 1973-95 and 1995-2003.   
                                                 
25  It is worth emphasizing that the Jorgenson-Griliches procedure for estimating the rate of return results 
in a common rate of return to both tangibles and intangibles.  This assumes that businesses arbitrage their 
investments across all types of capital, investing in each type until the rate of return for all assets is equal.  
While this assumption about investment may be disputed by Schumpeterians, we believe that it is the 
logical starting point for incorporating intangibles into the sources-of-growth analysis because it treats 
intangibles symmetrically with the way tangibles are treated in the existing SOG literature.  In particular, it 
is symmetric with the way the official SOG estimates are constructed by the BLS.  We also note that, as of 
this writing, the required BLS data extend through 2002.  Following Oliner and Sichel, we use a regression 
equation to project r(t) for 2003; explanatory variables include two lags of r(t), inflation in the nonfarm 
business sector, the acceleration of real output in the nonfarm business sector, the unemployment rate, and 
the profit share.  
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  To highlight how the accounting differs when intangibles are counted as investment, 





along with the associated shares.  As can be seen in the memo items, including all intangibles 
lowers the labor share of income from about 70 percent to 60 percent and raises the capital share 
(the sum of lines 12 and 13) from about 30 percent to 40 percent.  Note that intangibles account 
for 37.5 percent of all capital income (line 13 as a share of line 12 plus line 13).  
  The full time series of the new labor share is provided in figure 3.  The lowering of the 
labor share is one of the more startling results of the “new view” of intangibles.  Not only is 
labor' s share significantly lower when all intangibles are capitalized, the “new” share is no longer 
constant (as it appeared to be before software was capitalized).  Rather, the new share trends 
downward over the past five decades, particularly since 1980.  The growing wedge between the 
old and new views of labor' s share reflects the fact that an increasing fraction of capital income 
has been associated with intangibles.
26 
  To obtain an index of real output growth including the new intangibles, we aggregate the 
existing real nonfarm business output and the real investment series for each of the new categories 
of intangible assets, P
N
i(t)Ni(t), using a Divisia index procedure.
27   The result is the growth rate 
of output gQ(t)  =  sC(t)gC(t) + sI(t)gI(t) + ￿i sNi(t)gNi(t).  This is the final data series needed to 
complete the SOG analysis.   
                                                 
26 This income appears in the first column of table 4 (and on the income statements of companies in the 
economy) as retained earnings.  Additions to retained earnings translate into a long-run increase in national 
wealth as corporate share values increase.  To the individual investor, it appears as an increase in personal 
wealth from stocks, pensions, insurance, etc. 
27 Because nominal business investment for each of the new intangible assets is deflated with the nonfarm 
business deflator, Divisia aggregation and fixed-weight (or simple sum) aggregation yield the same series 
for real nonfarm business output including business investment in intangible assets.  
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                                              IV. Growth Accounting Results 
  The estimates of Section III provide the elements needed to construct growth accounts 
with intangibles.  We can then compare the SOG models with and without intangibles (equations 
1e and 2e of Section II).  The SOG results are shown in Table 5 for two periods, 1973-1995 and 
1995-2003, which were selected in order to analyze the role played by intangible investments in 
the productivity pick-up that is usually dated from 1995 in the recent SOG literature.
28         
  The top panel in Table 5 presents the growth accounts based on equation (1e), the SOG 
without any intangibles.
29  These results are based on BLS estimates of the growth of labor 
productivity in the nonfarm business sector, from which we have excluded software.
30  The 
estimates provide the baseline for comparison with SOG estimates based on equation (2e) with 
intangibles, shown in the bottom panel of Table 5.  A number of conclusions can be drawn from a 
comparison of the two panels.  First, it is apparent that the capitalization of intangibles increases 
the rate of growth of output per hour in both the 1973-1995 and 1995-2003 periods.  Interestingly, 
the increase in growth rates relative to the baseline is largest in the earlier period (20 percent) 
compared with the second (11 percent).  However, it is worth noting that the second period covers 
both the technology boom and the subsequent technology bust.  Estimates that refer only to the 
                                                 
28 The figures here follow the methodology described above, which also coincides with that used by the 
BLS to produce their estimates of multifactor productivity growth.  For a description of their methodology, 
see BLS (1983). 
29 The figures in table 5 and throughout the paper do not incorporate the 2005 annual revision of the 
NIPAs. 
30  The items listed under the heading ‘Contribution of Components’ are the growth rate of each input 
weighted by the corresponding income share.  In moving from one formulation to the other, we make 
appropriate adjustments to the income shares.  As of this writing, BLS’s published estimates extend 
through 2002, and we only had to estimate one year. This was done using the procedure developed in 
Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).  
  29 
1995-2000 period would show a greater influence of intangible investments on labor productivity 
growth.  The dependence of growth accounting estimates on the period of analysis, and 
particularly on the endpoints, is a well-known characteristic of this type of analysis. 
  Second, the relative importance of the factors “explaining” growth changes significantly 
when intangibles are introduced.  In the first period, the portion of top-line growth explained by 
intangibles goes from 0 percent in the top panel (by definition) to 26 percent with them, and the 
corresponding numbers for the 1995-2003 period are 0 percent and 27 percent, respectively.  
Moreover, intangibles moved up to parity with tangible capital in its importance as a source of 
growth during the second period.  Put another way, capital plays a larger role in accounting for 
labor productivity growth once intangibles are included.  In the earlier period, capital accounted 
for 59 percent of labor productivity growth when intangibles are included, but only 44 percent 
when they are excluded.  In the latter period, the difference is even greater, with capital 
accounting for 54 percent of growth when intangibles are included but only 35 percent when they 
are excluded. 
  Third, a comparison of MFP growth rates reveals that this source of growth declines both 
in absolute and relative importance when intangibles are included as investment.  This is most 
pronounced for the second period, during which the average annual growth rate of MFP drops 
from 1.42 percentage points under the “old” view to 1.08 percentage points when intangible 
investments are included in the analysis.  Expressed as a fraction of the rate of growth in output 
per hour, MFP declines in importance from 51 percent to 35 percent.  This result is not 
particularly surprising in light of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and in view of the fact that MFP 
is measured as a residual.    
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  Fourth, one thing that cannot be claimed for the “new” view is that intangibles affected the 
size of the mid-1990s pick-up in labor productivity itself.  The third column in both panels shows 
the percentage-point acceleration in each SOG factor between the two periods.  It is apparent that 
the size of the acceleration in labor productivity in percentage points was virtually the same in 
both panels. 
  Fifth, the source of the mid-1990s acceleration in labor productivity does change when 
intangibles are included.  In the top panel, the acceleration in MFP accounts for two-third of the 
total pickup when intangibles are excluded, but accounts for less that half in bottom panel when 
intangibles are included.  Correspondingly, the role of capital in the acceleration of labor 
productivity is considerably larger when intangibles are included. 
  In sum, the results shown in Table 5 strongly suggest that intangibles matter not just for 
national income and wealth accounting, but for growth accounting as well.  Indeed, our estimates, 
rough as they may be, imply that the traditional practice of expensing intangibles results in a 
seriously distorted picture of the sources of growth. 
  Table 6 continues the SOG of Table 5 by disaggregating line 6 of that table’s lower panel 
into the separate components shown in Table 1.  It is probably not surprising that computerized 
information (software) is an important factor driving the growth of the total intangible variable in 
Table 5, but it is perhaps more surprising that firm-specific resources are found to be of equal 
importance.  The rather small role of scientific R&D also is surprising in light of the attention that 
R&D has been given in the literature on innovation.  Scientific R&D accounts for only a modest 
portion of total intangible capital deepening and is markedly less important than investment in  
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software.
31  It also worth noting that the non-traditional types of intangibles highlighted in this 
paper –  nonscientific R&D, brand equity, and firm-specific resources –  together account for 
nearly 60 percent of total intangible capital deepening since 1995.  Because software is already 
capitalized in the NIPAs, and scientific R&D will probably be sometime over the next decade, our 
results suggest that growth accountants should not lose sight of these other forms of intangible 
capital. 
  This paper highlights the importance of intangibles as a source of economic growth.  
However, because software is already included in published growth accounts, another question is 
relevant:  how much impact would the capitalization of the other intangibles have on published 
growth rates?  Table 7 addresses this question by showing estimates for the nonfarm business 
sector, including software but not the other intangibles, for periods shown in Tables 5 and 6.  A 
comparison of the top-line result in Table 7 with the corresponding estimate on  line 1 in the 
lower panel of Table 5 indicates that the growth rate of output per hour is not greatly increased by 
the inclusion of the other intangibles from 1995-2003 (2.95 percent versus 3.09 percent).  
However, the composition of the sources of growth is affected, with a significantly greater role 
for capital deepening with full accounting for intangibles and a proportionately smaller role for 
MFP.  Again, the capitalization of intangibles matters for the understanding of economic growth. 
 
 
                                                 
31   This result hinges, at least in part, on our assumption that the nonfarm business output price is an 
appropriate deflator for scientific R&D.  If we followed the R&D literature and used a deflator with a 
wage component, the result that scientific R&D played a relatively small role in accounting for recent U.S. 
economic growth would be, if anything, stronger.  On the other hand, if the deflator for ICT investment 
were used instead (as suggested by Mairesse and Kosoglu 2005), we would find that scientific R&D 
played a more important role.    
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                                V.  Conclusion:  It’s the Knowledge Economy 
  The rapid expansion and application of technological knowledge in its many forms 
(research and development, capital-embodied technical change, human competency, and the 
associated firm-specific co-investments) is a key feature of recent U.S. economic growth.  
Accounting practice traditionally excludes the intangibles component of this knowledge capital 
and, according to our estimates, excludes approximately $1 trillion from conventionally measured 
nonfarm business sector output by the late 1990s and understates the business capital stock by 
$3.6 trillion.  The current practice also overstates labor’s share of income by a significant amount 
and masks a downward trend in that share.  Our results also suggest that the inclusion of 
intangibles both as an input and as an output can have a large impact on our understanding of 
economic growth.  We have found that the inclusion of intangible investment in the real output of 
the nonfarm business sector increases the estimated growth rate of output per hour by 10 to 20 
percent relative to the base-line case which completely ignores intangibles.  Thus, the inclusion of 
intangibles matters for labor productivity growth rates, although it has little effect on the 
acceleration of productivity in the 1990s.  On the input side, intangibles reached parity with 
tangible capital as a source growth after 1995, and when the two are combined, capital deepening 
supplants MFP as the principal source of growth.  Moreover, the majority of the contribution of 
intangibles comes from the non-traditional categories of intangibles identified in this paper. 
   It is also worth noting that the fraction of output growth per hour attributable to the old 
“bricks and mortar” forms of capital investment (labeled “other tangible” capital in the lower 
panel of table 5) is very small, accounting for less that 8 percent of the total growth in the period 
1995-2003.  While it is inappropriate to automatically attribute the other 92 percent to  
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“knowledge capital” or “the knowledge economy,” it is equally inappropriate to ignore the 
association between innovation, human capital, and knowledge acquisition, on the one hand, and 
investments in intangibles, IT capital, labor quality change, and multifactor productivity, on the 
other. 
    That intangibles, and more generally, knowledge capital should be such an important 
driver of modern economic growth is hardly surprising, given the evidence from every day life 
and the results of basic intertemporal economic theory.  What is surprising is that intangibles have 
been ignored for so long, and that they continue to be ignored in financial accounting practice at 
the firm level.  The results presented this paper are intended to illustrate the potential magnitude 
of the bias arising when they are excluded from economic growth accounting.  In the process, we 
have been forced to make a host of assumptions about many empirical issues, in order to measure 
such items as output deflators and non-market inputs like firm-specific organization and human 
competencies.  Further research will undoubtedly find better ways to deal with these issues, and 
future data collection efforts will evolve to fill the gaps that this paper only traverses lightly.  
However, while our results are clearly provisional, we are also mindful of the famous dictum of 
John Maynard Keynes that it is better to be imprecisely right than precisely wrong.    
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Table 1 
Business Intangibles: Total Spending and Capital Spending, 1998-2000 
(billions of dollars, annual average) 
 
     
          Type 
Total 
spending 
Comments on evidence as   
capital spending 
Capital spending 
(incl. in the NIPAs) 
1. Computerized 
     information 
    (mainly computer 
     software) 
 
154 
Firms capitalize only a fraction of 
purchased software in financial accounts.  
Relatively little is known about the 




2. Innovative property 
    (a) Scientific R&D 
     
     
    (b) Nonscientific 






Research suggests that scientific R&D 
yields relatively long-lasting returns and 
is capital spending. 
 
Little is known about nonscientific R&D, 
but a portion of new product development 
expenditures in the entertainment industry 









     competencies 
   (a) Brand equity 
 
    
   (b) Firm-specific 








Research shows that the effects of some 
advertising dissipate within one year, but 
that more than half has effects that last 
more than one year. 
 
Research suggests that firm-specific 
training is investment.  Spending for 
organizational change also likely has 
long-lived effects, but a portion of 









   Total        1,220 
 
            1,085 
          (205) 
Percent of Existing GDP 
Ratio to Tangible Capital Spending 
11.7 
1.2 
NOTE—Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.  
SOURCE—Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005), table 4.  Estimates are based on a one-year service life cutoff for 
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Table 2 
Business Investment in Intangibles 
(billions of dollars, annual average for period shown) 
  1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-89  1990-99  2000-03 
                       (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 1. Total CHS intangibles  19.4  41.9  103.4  349.3  749.8  1,226.2 
 2.   Computerized information 
        (mainly computer software)  --   .8      4.5    23.2  85.3  172.5 
 3.    Innovative property             
        (a) Scientific R&D  7.7  16.9  34.0  104.6  157.7  230.5 
        (b) Nonscientific R&D  .5  1.7  10.9  58.4  145.2  237.2 
 4.   Economic competencies             
        (a) Brand equity  5.3  9.5  18.2  54.4  105.7  160.8 
        (b) Firm-specific resources  5.9  13.0  35.7  108.7  255.9  425.1 
              Related series
1              
  5.   Computer software, NIPAs    --  .7  4.5  22.7  83.6  169.6 
  6.   Industrial R&D, NSF
2     5.2  14.1  25.3  75.8  136.9  196.0 
  7.   Advertising, Coen report  8.6  15.0  30.6  89.6  165.0  240.3 
  8.   Business fixed 
           investment, NIPAs 
      











  8a.        Tangibles     35.6  67.3  171.4  421.1  676.5  893.4 
  8b.        Intangibles
3  2.5  4.2  17.0  64.6  130.7  248.5 
            Memo:             
  9.  CHS intangibles, ratio to 













10.  New CHS intangibles
4  16.9  37.7  86.3  284.7  619.2  977.7 
11.  Nonfarm business output, ratio  
          of existing to adjusted for 













NOTE–All figures for investments in intangibles are derived using the sources and methods described in 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005), or CHS, based on a one-year service life cutoff. 
  1.  Sources indicated are as follows:  NIPAs, the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts; NSF, the 
National Science Foundation; and Coen report, advertising data developed by Bob Coen for Universal-McCann 
(see http://www.universalmccann.com/ourview.html).     
  2.  Prior to 1953, the industrial R&D estimates are from N. Terleckyj (1963). 
  3.  Includes computer software, mineral exploration, and architectural and design services embedded in 
structures and equipment purchases. 
  4.  Intangibles not recognized as capital in the NIPAs.  
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Table 3 
Value, Growth Rate, and Income Share of 
 Business Intangible Capital 
   
Value, billions 
of dollars 




Share of total 
income  
(percent) 
       
2003 
1973- 




  1995 
1995- 
 2003 
1. Total   3636.1       6.2             6.9          9.4  13.9 
 
2.    Computerized information 




   16.0 
 
        13.0 
 
          .8 
 
        2.3 
3.    Innovative property           
3a.        Scientific  922.3  3.6  3.9  2.4  2.5 
3b.       Nonscientific  864.4  12.4  7.2  1.0  2.2 
4.    Economic competencies           
4a.       Brand equity  271.8  4.2  4.6  1.7  2.0 
4b.       Firm-specific resources  1065.6  5.3  6.2  3.5  5.0 
Memo:           
5.  New CHS intangibles  3132.9  4.7  4.6  8.6  11.7 
   1.  The rates of change for the total and major categories are built from the individual real stocks 





  42 
 
Table 4 
Value of Output and Inputs, Nonfarm business sector, 2000-2003 











1.   Conventional nominal output (P
C C + P
I I)                              7670  7670 
2.  +  Intangible Investment ( P
N N)             0  1206 
3.  =    Nominal output  7670  8876 
4.   -   Indirect business taxes
1    736  736 
5.   -   Statistical discrepancy  -52  -52 
6.   =   Total income          6986  8192 
7.         Total income  6986  8192 
8.    =    Labor compensation (P
LL)   4915  4915 
9.    +    Income Accruing to 
          Tangible Capital (P
K K)





10.   +   Income Accruing to 
           Intangible Capital (P





Memo: Shares out of total income (percent)     
11.    Labor compensation (8)/(7)  70.4  60.0 
12.    Tangible capital (9)/(7)  29.6  25.0 
13.    Intangible capital (9)/(7)    15.0 
 
NOTE.  The figures in this table are consistent with those used by the BLS in putting together its multifactor 
productivity estimates for the nonfarm business sector.  The figures in the first column, however, exclude 
software, and thus nominal output (line 3) and total income (line 7) are lower by NIPA estimates for software 
spending by nonfarm businesses. 
1. Estimates of indirect business taxes for the nonfarm business sector (now known as taxes on production and 
imports) were inferred, given figures for lines 3, 5, and 6.  
2. The figure for income accruing to tangible capital in the second column differs from that in the first column 
because the net rate of return—the term r(t) in equation (6)—changes slightly when intangibles are included.  




Annual Change in Labor Productivity,  
Nonfarm Business Sector 
 
Published data, excluding software 
         1973- 
          1995 
     1995- 




1. Labor productivity (percent)
1  1.36  2.78  1.42 
Contribution of Components:
2       
2. Capital deepening  .60  .98  .38 
3.      IT equipment  .33  .70  .37 
4.      Other tangible capital  .27  .28  .01 
5. Labor composition  .28  .38  .10 
6. Multifactor productivity  .48  1.42  .94 
Published data, including business investment in intangibles 
 1. Labor productivity (percent)
1  1.63  3.09  1.45 
Contribution of Components:
2       
 2. Capital deepening  .97  1.68  .71 
 3.     Tangibles  .55  .85  .30 
 4.         IT equipment  .30  .60  .30 
 5.         Other
3  .25  .24  -.01 
 6.     Intangibles     .43  .84  .41 
 7.        Software  .12  .27  .15 
 8.        Other (new CHS)  .31  .57  .26 
10. Labor composition  .25  .33  .08 
11. Multifactor productivity  .41  1.08  .67 
   1. Output per hour of all persons. 
   2. Percentage points.  Components may not sum to totals because of 
independent rounding. 
   3. Includes mineral exploration and the architectural and design services 
embedded in equipment purchases that are part of “CHS intangibles included in 
the NIPAs” in tables 1 and 2.  
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Table 6 
Contribution of Intangible Capital Deepening to the  
Annual Change in Labor Productivity,  
Nonfarm Business Sector 
(percentage points) 
 
  1973- 





  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 1.  Intangible capital deepening  .43  .84  .41 
 2.      Computerized information  .12  .27  .15 
 3.       Innovative property  .13  .22  .09 
 3a.          Scientific  .05  .08  .03 
 3b.          Nonscientific  .08  .14  .06 
 4.       Economic competencies  .17  .35  .18 
 4a.          Brand equity  .04  .08  .04 
 4b.          Firm-specific resources  .13  .27  .14 
    NOTE—Components may not sum to totals because of independent 
rounding.  
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Table 7 
Annual Change in Labor Productivity,  




  1973- 






1. Labor productivity (percent)
1  1.47  2.95  1.48 
Contribution of components:
2       
2. Capital deepening  .73  1.26  .53 
3.     IT equipment and software  .46  .99  .53 
4.     Other equip. and structures  .27  .27  .00 
5. Labor composition  .27  .37  .10 
6. Multifactor productivity  .47  1.32  .85 
1. Output per hour of all persons.     
2.  Percentage points.  Components may not sum to totals because of 
independent rounding 
SOURCE—Unpublished update to Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) based 
on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multifactor Productivity 
Trends, 2002 (2004). 
 













































Note: C.I. = Computerized information
Figure 2
Intangible Investments

















Note: BLS basis (output excludes government enterprises, labor income includes nonemployees).
Figure 3
Labor Shares
(percent of nonfarm business output)